The ongoing criminal trial of five former Canadian World Junior hockey players has gripped public attention and reignited an essential conversation about the legal definition of consent—particularly when alcohol or drugs are involved.

The case, being heard in a London, Ontario courtroom, involves serious allegations stemming from an incident in 2018, during a Hockey Canada gala.

For legal professionals, the case is more than just a high-profile proceeding. It offers a real-time examination of how Canadian courts interpret consent, capacity, and the role of intoxication in sexual assault law. Understanding these principles is critical not only for criminal practitioners, but also for those in civil litigation, education law, risk management, and institutional compliance.

Case Background

The charges involve five NHL-affiliated players: Michael McLeod, Dillon Dubé, Carter Hart, Cal Foote, and Alex Formenton. They stand accused of sexually assaulting a woman at a hotel in London, Ontario, after a team event in June 2018.

According to the Crown, the complainant voluntarily accompanied one of the players to a hotel room and engaged in consensual sex. However, things changed when multiple teammates entered the room and participated in sexual acts. The woman, who had consumed approximately eight alcoholic drinks, alleges she felt frozen, confused, and unable to meaningfully consent due to her level of intoxication and the coercive nature of the situation.

All five men have pleaded not guilty.

The Legal Definition of Consent in Canada

In Canadian criminal law, consent is defined under section 273.1(1) of the Criminal Code as the voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in sexual activity. Importantly, the law requires affirmative, ongoing, and conscious agreement—not mere acquiescence or silence.

To be legally valid, consent must be:

• Informed – The person understands the nature of the act.
• Voluntary – Given freely without coercion, threat, or manipulation.
• Capable – Given by someone with the mental and physical ability to choose.

Intoxication and Capacity to Consent

A pivotal legal issue in this trial—and many like it—is whether a person who is intoxicated by alcohol or drugs has the capacity to consent. The answer, increasingly affirmed by Canadian jurisprudence, is no if the intoxication significantly impairs the person’s cognitive functioning.

Key precedents include:

• R. v. J.A. (2011 SCC 28): The Supreme Court of Canada held that a person must be conscious and capable throughout the sexual activity in question to legally consent. Consent cannot be given in advance while unconscious or incapacitated.
• R. v. Al-Rawi (2018 NSCA 10): The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal concluded that an individual who is so intoxicated they cannot understand the nature of the sexual act cannot give legal consent.
• G.F. v. R. (2021 SCC 20): The Court reaffirmed that the capacity to consent must be evaluated based on whether the person was able to understand the sexual activity and communicate agreement—not simply on whether they remembered the event later.

Under these rulings, the issue for the court becomes not simply whether the complainant said “yes,” but whether she was legally capable of saying yes at all.

Legal and Professional Implications

This trial has broad ramifications for the legal and professional communities:

1. Criminal Law

Defense and Crown attorneys must present detailed, nuanced arguments about the complainant’s state of mind, level of intoxication, and the presence or absence of affirmative, continuous consent. Toxicology reports, video evidence, and witness testimony play a central role.

2. Civil Liability

Should the criminal trial result in convictions, Hockey Canada, team organizations, and even affiliated NHL franchises may face civil suits for negligence, institutional failure to protect, and vicarious liability. Legal advisors must prepare for potential claims under tort law and human rights codes.

3. Institutional Policy & Risk

This case sends a clear signal to universities, athletic programs, and employers: robust consent education and alcohol policies are essential. Institutions must train staff and students on what consent means legally—and how intoxication nullifies it.

Conclusion: Defining Consent in a Culture of Accountability

As the London trial unfolds, it reminds us that consent is not a gray area under Canadian law—it is a clearly defined legal standard that centers on clarity, capacity, and voluntariness. Intoxication, whether voluntary or involuntary, does not excuse perpetrators and does not enable consent from the impaired party.

For legal professionals, the case reinforces the importance of educating clients—whether individuals, institutions, or corporations—on how Canadian law interprets consent. It also underscores the continuing need for legal reform, cultural change, and survivor-centered justice.