International Antitrust Law | Technology | Asia

Introduction

In yet another front of global antitrust scrutiny, Apple Inc. is under fire in China. A group of 55 Chinese iPhone and iPad users has filed a formal complaint with the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR), alleging that Apple’s App Store policies amount to an abuse of dominant market position. The core allegations: restricting app distribution to its own App Store, mandating use of its Payment system for in‑app purchases, and maintaining a commission of up to 30 % on digital goods. (Reuters)
This case marks a significant escalation of regulatory risk for Apple in its second‑largest market and may presage broader changes in how platform gatekeepers are treated under Chinese competition law.

Factual Background & Scope of the Complaint

The complaint was lodged on October 20, 2025 by Chinese consumers represented by attorney Wang Qiongfei. It centres on three key allegations under China’s Anti‑Monopoly Law (AML):

1. The mandatory use of Apple’s In‑App Purchase (IAP) system for digital goods, making it impossible to use alternative payment methods. (Investing.com Canada)
2. Restricting iOS app downloads exclusively to Apple’s App Store, thereby preventing third‑party app stores or sideloading on iOS devices in China. (The Economic Times)
3. Charging a commission as high as 30 % for in‑app purchases, which plaintiffs say is excessive and has not been justified by cost structure. (MacDailyNews)

The filing points out that Apple allows more flexibility in other major jurisdictions (such as certain external payment links or app‑store alternatives in the European Union) but continues to enforce a closed ecosystem in China. (MacRumors)
Earlier private litigation in China (a 2021 complaint) had sought damages for similar practices but was dismissed by the Shanghai Intellectual Property Court. (South China Morning Post)
This new complaint presents a shift from civil private rights to administrative enforcement via SAMR, which could move faster and carry regulatory teeth.

Legal Issues at Stake

Dominance & Conduct Under China’s Anti‑Monopoly Law

Under the AML, dominant firms must abstain from conduct that eliminates or restricts competition or abuses a dominant market position. The complaint asserts that Apple enjoys dominance in the iOS platform ecosystem in China. While past courts have accepted this dominance for certain Apple products, the key legal question is whether the challenged practices constitute an abuse of that dominance. (Clifford Chance)
Conduct under scrutiny includes tying (bundling) iOS hardware with exclusive control of app distribution and payments, and the 30 % cut being alleged as an excessive pricing or unfair trading condition.

Tying / Exclusive Dealing and Barriers to Entry

By requiring all apps to be distributed through Apple’s store and payments via its system, the complaint argues that alternative app‑stores or payment platforms are foreclosed. That raises questions of whether Apple’s ecosystem constitutes an essential facility or gate‑keeper. The plaintiff’s argument draws parallels to high‑profile cases elsewhere (e.g., the Epic Games v. Apple litigation in the U.S.). (Wikipedia)

Excessive Pricing / High Commission

The allegation that the 30 % commission lacks justification touches on excessive pricing doctrine. Chinese courts have traditionally been conservative in applying excessive pricing under the AML, given debates over cost‑based benchmarks. For example, in May 2024 the Shanghai court rejected a consumer claim against Apple, noting difficulty in assessing excessiveness. (AppleInsider)

Comparative Regulatory Regimes & Treatment of Platform Gatekeepers

The complaint explicitly points to Apple’s more lenient practices elsewhere — e.g., in the EU under the Digital Markets Act (DMA) or in the U.S. anti‑steering rulings — to argue that Apple is imposing stricter rules in China. This comparative argument may bolster the regulatory narrative in China about foreign tech firms being subject to differentiated regulation. (PYMNTS.com)

Potential Implications & Strategy Considerations

For Apple

• A finding of anti‑competitive conduct could lead to regulatory orders requiring changes in the App Store business model in China (e.g., permitting alternative payment methods, opening app distribution).
• Monetary penalties under the AML could be significant (up to 10% of domestic turnover per Chinese precedent) though exact amounts depend on the regulator’s discretion.
• Protecting its ecosystem in China is particularly strategic for Apple: China remains a key market for device sales and supply‑chain manufacturing. Any forced restructuring of its App Store model may have broader global implications.

For Developers and Consumers in China

• Developers may gain leverage to negotiate alternative payment methods or distributions, similar to shifts in other jurisdictions.
• Consumers may see downward pressure on pricing or greater choice in payment/platform options if the case advances and induces regulatory change.

For Regulators and Global Platform Governance

• This case reinforces the trend of national regulators leveraging antitrust law to challenge U.S. tech firms’ platform practices (in parallel with the EU, India, Brazil).
• It may serve as a template for how regulators can trigger action via a consumer‑group complaint (rather than waiting for formal investigations).
• The comparative element (showing more lenient regulation elsewhere) might fuel regulatory momentum in China to require “equal treatment” or impose further constraints on foreign tech platforms.

Outlook & Next Steps

The complaint is now with SAMR; the timeline is uncertain, but administrative investigations often proceed faster than civil litigation. The filing references the prior 2021 case now pending appeal at China’s Supreme People’s Court, which may influence the regulatory approach. (Investing.com Canada)
Key watch‑points:

• Whether SAMR initiates a formal investigation or accepts the complaint for enforcement action.
• Whether Apple responds by offering concessions in China (e.g., lowering commission, opening payment alternatives) to pre‑empt formal remedies.
• Whether this case signals further domestic Chinese scrutiny of platform gate‑keepers (both foreign and domestic) in sectors beyond mobile apps.

Conclusion

Apple’s new antitrust complaint in China marks a pivotal moment in the global regulatory spotlight on platform power, particularly in the fast‑evolving mobile app ecosystem. For Apple, the risk is not merely financial—it touches the foundational design of its iOS ecosystem and business model in its second‑largest market. For regulators, it represents a growing appetite to enforce competition law in digital markets fearlessly. And for developers and consumers, it may herald the beginning of new freedoms in app distribution and payments.
In the broader narrative of antitrust in the digital age, the case serves as a reminder: even the most powerful platform gate‑keepers are not immune from jurisdictionally distinct challenges—and how they respond in China may set the tone for platform regulation worldwide.